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Abstract: In the literature, utility functions in the expected utility class are generically 
limited to second-order (conditional) risk aversion, while non-expected utility functions 
can exhibit either first-order or second-order (conditional) risk aversion. This paper 
extends the concepts of order of conditional risk aversion to orders of conditional 
dependent risk aversion. We show that first-order conditional dependent risk aversion is 
consistent with the framework of the expected utility hypothesis. We relate our results to 
risk diversification and provide additional insights into its application in different 
economic and finance examples. 
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Résumé: Les fonctions d’espérance d’utilité von Newmann-Morgenstein sont limitées à 
une aversion au risque (conditionnelle) de deuxième ordre, alors que les fonctions plus 
générales (non-expected utility functions) peuvent tenir compte d’aversions au risque de 
premier et de second ordre. Ce document propose une extension au concept d’aversion 
au risque conditionnel à celui d’aversion au risque conditionnelle dépendante. Nous 
montrons que l’aversion au risque conditionnelle dépendante de premier ordre est 
consistante avec le modèle d’espérance d’utilité von Neumann-Morgenstern. Nous 
relions nos résultats à la diversification du risque et présentons des exemples 
d’application en économique et en finance. 
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1 Introduction
The concepts of second-order and first-order risk aversion were coined by Segal and Spivak
(1990). For an actuarially fair random variable ε˜, second-order risk aversion means that the
risk premium the agent is willing to pay to avoid kε˜ is proportional to k2 as k → 0. Under
first-order risk aversion, the risk premium is proportional to k. Loomes and Segal (1994) extend
this notion to preferences about uninsured events, such as independent additive background
risks. They introduce the concept of orders of conditional risk aversion. We define y˜ as an
independent additive risk. The conditional risk premium is defined as the amount of money the
decision maker is willing to pay to avoid ε˜ in the presence of y˜. The preference relation satisfies
first-order conditional risk aversion if the risk premium the agent is willing to pay to avoid kε˜ is
proportional to k as k → 0. It satisfies second-order conditional risk aversion if the risk premium
is proportional to k2.
To the best of our knowledge, utility functions in the von Neumann-Morgenstern expected
utility class can generically exhibit only second-order conditional risk aversion, while non-
expected utility functions can exhibit either first-order or second-order (conditional) risk aver-
sion1. First-order (conditional) risk aversion implies that small risks matter. Since expected
utility theory is limited to second-order (conditional) risk aversion, it cannot take into account
many real world results. For example, Epstein and Zin (1990) find that first-order risk aversion
can help to resolve the equity premium puzzle. Schlesinger (1997) uses first-order risk aversion
to explain why full insurance coverage may be optimal even when there is a positive premium
loading. Further applications of first-order risk aversion appear in Schmidt (1999), Barberis et
al. (2001), Barberis et al. (2006), and Chapman and Polkovnichenko (2009), among others.
In this paper, we extend the concept of order conditional risk aversion to order conditional
dependent risk aversion, for which ε˜ and y˜ are dependent and y˜ may enter the agent’s utility
function in a rather arbitrary manner. We investigate whether first-order conditional dependent
risk aversion appears in the framework of the expected utility hypothesis. The general answer
to the above question is positive with some restrictions.
We propose conditions on the stochastic structure between ε˜ and y˜ that guarantee first-
order conditional dependent risk aversion for expected utility agents with a certain type of risk
preference, i.e., correlation aversion. Eeckhoudt et al. (2007) provide an economic interpretation
1See Eeckhoudt et al. (2005), Chapter 13, for more discussion.
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of correlation aversion: a higher level of the background variable mitigates the detrimental effect
of a reduction in wealth. It turns out that the concept of expectation dependence, proposed by
Wright (1987), is the key element to such stochastic structure. Further, the more information
that we possess about the sign of higher cross derivatives of the utility function,2 the weaker
dependence conditions on distribution we need. These weaker dependence conditions, which
demonstrate the applicability of a weak version of expectation dependence (called N th-order
expectation dependence (Li, 2011)), induce weaker dependence conditions between ε˜ and y˜, to
guarantee first-order conditional dependent risk aversion.
Risk premium is an important concept in economics and finance. Intuition suggests that
the risk premium for a diversified risk should relate to the number of trials n. We investigate
a correlation averse risk premium for a naive diversified risk in the presence of a dependent
background risk. The naive diversified risk is defined as one in which a fraction 1n of wealth is
allocated to each of the n risks. In the absence of a dependent background risk, the population
mean value of the naive diversified risk approximates the expected value. The “Law of Large
Numbers” states that the risk premium converges to zero when n is large. This is often called
the benefit of diversification. Given that, in real life, an agent can diversify wealth only on a
limited number of risks, a natural question is how small is the risk premium in the presence of
a dependent background risk? In other words, what is the convergence rate or approximation
error? Our results show that the convergence rate is at the order of 1
n2
in the presence of
an independent background risk compared with 1n in the presence of a dependent background
risk. This difference is a quantitative statement on the benefice of diversification which provides
information on how background risk affects the risk premium of a a naive diversified risk. This
result also provides additional insights regarding previous results on insurance supply, public
investment decisions, naive diversified portfolio pricing, bank lending and lottery business in the
presence of a dependent background risk.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 sets up the model. Section 3 discusses the concept
of orders of conditional risk aversion. Section 4 investigates the orders of conditional dependent
risk aversion. Section 5 discusses some weaker dependence conditions. Section 6 applies the
results to different economic and financial examples. Section 7 concludes this paper.
2Eeckhoudt et al. (2007) provide a context-free interpretation for the sign of higher cross derivatives of the
utility function.
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2 The model
We consider an agent whose preference for a random wealth, w˜, and a random outcome, y˜, can
be represented by a bivariate expected utility function. Let u(w, y) be the utility function, and
let u1(w, y) denote ∂u∂w and u2(w, y) denote
∂u
∂y , and follow the same subscript convention for
higher derivatives u11(w, y) and u12(w, y) and so on. We assume that all partial derivatives
required for any definition exist. We make the standard assumption that u1 > 0.
Let us assume that z˜ = kε˜. Parameter k can be interpreted as the size of the risk. One way
to measure an agent’s degree of risk aversion for z˜ is to ask her how much she is ready to pay to
get rid of z˜. The answer to this question will be referred to as the risk premium pi(k) associated
with that risk. For an agent with utility function u and non random initial wealth w, the risk
premium, pi(k), must satisfy the following condition:
u(w + Ekε˜− pi(k), Ey˜) = Eu(w + kε˜, Ey˜). (1)
Segal and Spivak (1990) give the following definitions of first and second-order risk aversion:
Definition 2.1 (Segal and Spivak 1990) The agent’s attitude towards risk at w is of first order
if for every ε˜ with Eε˜ = 0, pi′(0) 6= 0.
Definition 2.2 (Segal and Spivak 1990) The agent’s attitude towards risk at w is of second
order if for every ε˜ with Eε˜ = 0, pi′(0) = 0 but pi′′(0) 6= 0.
They provide the following results linking properties of a utility function to its order of risk
aversion given level of wealth w0:
(a) If a risk averse von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function u is not differentiable at w0 but
has well-defined and distinct left and right derivatives at w0, then the agent exhibits first-order
risk aversion at w0.
(b) If a risk averse von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function u is twice differentiable at w0
with u11 6= 0, then the agent exhibits second-order risk aversion at w0.
Segal and Spivak (1997) point out that, if the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function is
increasing, then it must be differentiable almost everywhere, and one may therefore convincingly
argue that non-differentiability is not often observed in the expected utility model. Therefore
first-order risk aversion cannot be taken into account in this model.
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3 Order of conditional risk aversion
Loomes and Segal (1994) introduced the order of conditional risk aversion by examining the
characteristic of pi(k) in the presence of independent uninsured risks. For an agent with utility
function u and initial wealth w, the conditional risk premium, pic(k), must satisfy the following
condition:
Eu(w + Ekε˜− pic(k), y˜) = Eu(w + kε˜, y˜). (2)
where ε˜ and y˜ are independent.
Definition 3.1 (Loomes and Segal 1994) The agent’s attitude towards risk at w is first order
conditional risk aversion if for every ε˜ with Eε˜ = 0, pi′c(0) 6= 0.
Definition 3.2 (Loomes and Segal 1994) The agent’s attitude towards risk at w is second order
conditional risk aversion if for every ε˜ with Eε˜ = 0, pi′c(0) = 0 but pi′′c (0) 6= 0.
It is obvious that the definitions of first and second order conditional risk aversion are more
general than the definitions of first and second order risk aversion
We can extend the above definitions to the case Eε˜ 6= 0. Since u is differentiable, fully
differentiating (2) with respect to k yields
E{[Eε˜− pi′c(k)]u1(w + Ekε˜− pic(k), y˜)} = E[ε˜u1(w + kε˜, y˜)]. (3)
Since ε˜ and y˜ are independent, then
pi′c(0) =
Eε˜Eu1(w, y˜)− E[ε˜u1(w, y˜)]
Eu1(w, y˜)
= 0. (4)
Therefore, not only does pic(k) approach zero as k approaches zero, but also pi′c(0) = 0. This
implies that, at the margin, accepting a small zero-mean risk has no effect on the welfare of
risk-averse agents. This is an important property of expected-utility theory: “in the small”, the
expected-utility maximizers are risk neutral.
Using a Taylor expansion of pic around k = 0, we obtain that
pic(k) = pic(0) + pi′c(0)k +O(k
2) = O(k2). (5)
This result is the Arrow-Pratt approximation, which states that the conditional risk premium
is approximately proportional to the square of the size of the risk.
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Within the von Neumann-Morgenstern expected-utility model, if the random outcome and
the background risk are independent, then second-order conditional risk aversion relies on the
assumption that the utility function is differentiable. Hence, with an independent background
risk, utility functions in the von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility class can generically
exhibit only second-order conditional risk aversion and cannot explain the rejection of a small,
independent, and actuarially favorable gamble.
4 Order of conditional dependent risk aversion
We now introduce the concept of order of conditional dependent risk aversion. For an agent
with utility function u and initial wealth w, the conditional dependent risk premium, picd(k),
must satisfy the following condition:
Eu(w +Ekε˜− picd(k), y˜) = Eu(w + kε˜, y˜). (6)
where ε˜ and y˜ are not necessarily independent3.
Definition 4.1 The agent’s attitude towards risk at w is first order conditional dependent risk
aversion if for every ε˜, picd(k)− pic(k) = O(k).
Definition 4.2 The agent’s attitude towards risk at w is second order conditional dependent
risk aversion if for every ε˜, picd(k)− pic(k) = O(k2).
picd(k) − pic(k) measures how dependence between risks affects risk premium. Second order
conditional dependent risk aversion implies that, in the presence of a dependent background
risk, small risk has no effect on risk premium, while first order conditional dependent risk
aversion implies that, in the presence of a dependent background risk, small risk affects risk
premium.
We denote F (ε, y) and f(ε, y) the joint distribution and density functions of (ε˜, y˜), respec-
tively. Fε(ε) and Fy(y) are the marginal distributions.
Wright (1987) introduces the following idea in the economic literature.
3In the statistical literature, the sequence bk is at most of order k
λ, denoted as bk = O(k
λ), if for some finite
real number ∆ > 0, there exists a finite integer K such that for all k > K, |kλbk| < ∆ (see, White 2000, p16).
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Definition 4.3 (Wright 1987) If
ED(y) = [Eε˜− E(ε˜|y˜ ≤ y)] ≥ 0 for all y, (7)
and there is at least some y0 for which a strong inequality holds,
then ε˜ is positive expectation dependent on y˜. Similarly, ε˜ is negative expectation dependent on
y˜ if (7) holds with the inequality sign reversed.
Wright (1987, p115) interprets negative first-degree expectation dependence as follows: “when
we discover y˜ is small, in the precise sense that we are given the truncation y˜ ≤ y, our expectation
of ε˜ is revised upward”. This definition of dependence is useful for deriving an explicit value of
picd(k).
Lemma 4.4
picd(k) = −k
∫∞
−∞ED(y)u12(w, y)Fy(y)dy
Eu1(w, y˜)
+O(k2). (8)
Proof From the definition of picd(k), we know that
Eu(w +Ekε˜− picd(k), y˜) = Eu(w + kε˜, y˜). (9)
Differentiating with respect to k yields
pi′cd(k) =
Eε˜Eu(w +Ekε˜− picd(k), y˜)− E[ε˜u1(w + kε˜, y˜)]
Eu1(w − picd(k), y˜) . (10)
Since picd(0) = 0, we have
pi′cd(0) =
Eε˜Eu1(w, y˜)−E[ε˜u1(w, y˜)]
Eu1(w, y˜)
. (11)
Note that
E[ε˜u1(w, y˜)] = Eε˜Eu1(w, y˜) + Cov(ε˜, u1(w, y˜)) (12)
and the covariance can always be written as (see, Cuadras (2002), Theorem 1)
Cov(ε˜, u1(w, y˜)) =
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ ∞
−∞
[F (ε, y)− Fε(ε)FY (y)]dεdu1(w, y). (13)
Since we can always write (see, e.g., Tesfatsion (1976), Lemma 1)
∫ ∞
−∞
[Fε(ε|y˜ ≤ y)− Fε(ε)]dε = Eε˜− E(ε˜|y˜ ≤ y), (14)
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hence, by straightforward manipulations we find
Cov(ε˜, u1(w, y˜)) =
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ ∞
−∞
[F (ε, y)− Fε(ε)Fy(y)]u12(w0, y)dεdy (15)
=
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ ∞
−∞
[Fε(ε|y˜ ≤ y)− Fε(ε)]dεFy(y)u12(w, y)dy
=
∫ ∞
−∞
[Eε˜− E(ε˜|y˜ ≤ y)]Fy(y)u12(w, y)dy (by (14))
=
∫ ∞
−∞
ED(y)u12(w, y)Fy(y)dy.
Finally, we get
pi′cd(0) = −
∫∞
−∞ED(y)u12(w, y)Fy(y)dy
Eu1(w, y˜)
. (16)
Using a Taylor expansion of pi around k = 0, we obtain that
picd(k) = picd(0) + pi′cd(0)k +O(k
2) = −k
∫∞
−∞ED(y)u12(w, y)Fy(y)dy
Eu1(w, y˜)
+O(k2). (17)
Q.E.D.
Lemma 4.4 shows the general condition for first order risk aversion. The condition involves
two important concepts u12 and ED(y). The sign of u12 indicates how this first element acts
on utility u. Eeckhoudt et al. (2007) provide a context-free interpretation of the sign of u12.
They show that u12 ≤ 0 is necessary and sufficient for “correlation aversion”, meaning that a
higher level of the background variable mitigates the detrimental effect of a reduction in wealth.
This condition involves the expectation dependence between two risks and the cross derivative
of the utility function. It captures the welfare interaction between the two risks. The sign
of the first-degree expectation dependence indicates whether the movements on background
risk tend to reinforce the movements on wealth (positive first-degree expectation dependence)
or to counteract them (negative first-degree expectation dependence). Lemma (4.4) allows a
quantitative treatment of the direction and size of first-degree expectation dependence effect
on first order risk aversion. To clarify this, consider the following cases: (1) assume the agent
is correlation neutral (u12 = 0) or the background risk is independent (ED(y) = 0), then the
agent’s attitude towards risk is second order conditional dependent risk aversion; (2) Assume
u12 < 0 and ED(y) > 0 (ED(y) < 0), then the agent’s attitude towards risk is first order
conditional dependent risk aversion and her marginal risk premium for a small risk is positive
(negative) (i.e., limk→0+ pi′cd(k) > (<)0).
From Lemma (4.4) and Equation (5), we obtain
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Proposition 4.5 (i) If ε˜ is positive expectation dependent on y˜ and u12 < 0, then the agent’s
attitude towards risk is first order conditional dependent risk aversion and picd(k) − pic(k) =
|O(k)|;
(ii) If ε˜ is negative expectation dependent on y˜ and u12 > 0, then the agent’s attitude towards
risk is first order conditional dependent risk aversion and picd(k)− pic(k) = |O(k)|;
(iii) If ε˜ is positive expectation dependent on y˜ and u12 > 0, then the agent’s attitude towards
risk is first order conditional dependent risk aversion and picd(k)− pic(k) = −|O(k)|;
(iv) If ε˜ is negative expectation dependent on y˜ and u12 < 0, then the agent’s attitude towards
risk is first order conditional dependent risk aversion and picd(k)− pic(k) = −|O(k)|.
We consider two examples to illustrate Proposition 4.5.
Example 1. Consider the additive background risk case u(x, y) = U(x + y). Here x
may be the random wealth of an agent and y may be a random income risk which cannot be
insured. Since u12 < 0 ⇔ U ′′ < 0, part (i) and (iv) of Proposition 4.5 implies that, if the
agent is risk averse and ε˜ is positive (negative) expectation dependent on the background risk
y˜, then the agent’s attitude towards risk is first order conditional dependent risk aversion and
picd(k) > (<)pic(k).
Example 2. Consider the multiplicative background risk case u(x, y) = U(xy). Here x may
be the random wealth of an agent and y may be a random interest rate risk which cannot be
hedged. Since u12 < 0 ⇔ −xyU
′′(xy)
U ′(xy) > 1 (relative risk aversion greater than 1), Proposition
4.5 implies that, (i) if −xyU ′′(xy)U ′(xy) > 1 and ε˜ is positive (negative) expectation dependent on the
background risk y˜, then the agent’s attitude towards risk is first order conditional dependent
risk aversion and picd(k) > (<)pic(k); (ii) if −xyU
′′(xy)
U ′(xy) < 1 and ε˜ is positive (negative) expec-
tation dependent on the background risk y˜, then the agent’s attitude towards risk is first order
conditional dependent risk aversion and picd(k) < (>)pic(k).
5 First-order conditional dependent risk aversion and N th-order
expectation dependent background risk
Li (2011) considers the following weaker dependence: suppose y˜ ∈ [c, d], where c and d are
finite. Rewriting 1thED(x˜|y) = FED(x˜|y), 2thED(x˜|y) = SED(x˜|y) = ∫ yc FED(x˜|t)Fy(t)dt,
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and repeated integrals defined by
N thED(x˜|y) =
∫ y
c
(N − 1)thED(x˜|t)dt, for N ≥ 3. (18)
Definition 5.1 (Li 2011) If mthED(x˜|d) ≥ 0, for m = 2, ..., N − 1 and
N thED(x˜|y) ≥ 0 for all y ∈ [c, d], (19)
then x˜ is positive N th-order expectation dependent (NED) on y˜. The family of all distributions F
satisfying (19) will be denoted by HN . Similarly, x˜ is negative N th-order expectation dependent
on y˜ if (19) holds with the inequality sign reversed, and the family of all negative N th-order
expectation dependent distributions will be denoted by IN .
From this definition, we know that HN ⊃ HN−1 and IN ⊃ IN−1. In the following lemma, we
obtain the risk premium in the presence of an N th-order expectation dependent background
risk.
Lemma 5.2
picd(k) (20)
= −k
∑N
m=2(−1)mu12(m−1)(w, d)mthED(x˜|d) +
∫ d
c (−1)N+1u12(N)(w, y)N thED(x˜|y)dy
Eu1(w, y˜)
+O(k2).
Proof From (12) and (14), we know that
E[ε˜u1(w, y˜)] = Eε˜Eu1(w, y˜) + Cov(ε˜, u1(w, y˜)) = Eε˜Eu1(w, y˜) +
∫ ∞
−∞
ED(y)u12(w, y)Fy(y)dy.(21)
We simply integrate the last term of (21) by parts again and again until we obtain:
Cov(ε˜, u1(w, y˜)) =
N∑
m=2
(−1)mu12(m−1)(w, d)mthED(x˜|d) (22)
+
∫ d
c
(−1)N+1u12(N)(w, y)N thED(x˜|y)dy, forN ≥ 2.
From (11), we have
pi′cd(0) (23)
=
Eε˜Eu1(w, y˜)−E[ε˜u1(w, y˜)]
Eu1(w, y˜)
−k
∑N
m=2(−1)mu12(m−1)(w, d)mthED(x˜|d) +
∫ d
c (−1)N+1u12(N)(w, y)N thED(x˜|y)dy
Eu1(w, y˜)
.
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Using a Taylor expansion of pi around k = 0, we obtain that
picd(k) (24)
= picd(0) + pi′cd(0)k +O(k
2)
= −k
∑N
m=2(−1)mu12(m−1)(w, d)mthED(x˜|d) +
∫ d
c (−1)N+1u12(N)(w, y)N thED(x˜|y)dy
Eu1(w, y˜)
+O(k2).
Q.E.D.
From Lemma (5.2) and Equation (5), we obtain
Proposition 5.3 (i) If (ε˜, y˜) ∈ HN and (−1)mu12(m−1) ≤ 0 for m = 1, 2, ..., N + 1, then the
agent’s attitude towards risk is first order conditional dependent risk aversion and picd(k) −
pic(k) = |O(k)|;
(ii) If (ε˜, y˜) ∈ IN and (−1)mu12(m−1) ≥ 0 for m = 1, 2, ..., N + 1, then the agent’s attitude
towards risk is first order conditional dependent risk aversion and picd(k)− pic(k) = |O(k)|;
(iii) If (ε˜, y˜) ∈ HN and (−1)mu12(m−1) ≥ 0 for m = 1, 2, ..., N + 1, then the agent’s attitude
towards risk is first order conditional dependent risk aversion and picd(k)− pic(k) = −|O(k)|;
(iv) If (ε˜, y˜) ∈ IN and (−1)mu12(m−1) ≤ 0 for m = 1, 2, ..., N + 1, then the agent’s attitude
towards risk is first order conditional dependent risk aversion and picd(k)− pic(k) = −|O(k)|.
Eeckhoudt et al. (2007, p120) also provide an intuitive interpretation for the meaning of the
sign of the higher order cross derivatives of utility function, u12(k) . For example, u122 > 0 is a
necessary and sufficient condition for “cross-prudence in wealth”, meaning that higher wealth
reduces the detrimental effect of the background risk. We consider two examples to illustrate
Proposition 5.3.
Example 3. Consider the additive background risk case u(x, y) = U(x + y). Since
(−1)mu12(m−1) ≤ 0 ⇔ (−1)mU (m) ≤ 0, parts (i) and (iv) of Proposition 4.5 imply that, if
the agent is kth degree risk averse (See Ekern, 1980 and Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger, 2006 for
more discussions of kth degree of risk aversion.) for m = 1, 2, ..., N + 1 and ε˜ is positive (neg-
ative) Nth expectation dependent on the background risk y˜, then the agent’s attitude towards
risk is first order conditional dependent risk aversion and picd(k) > (<)pic(k).
Example 4. Consider the multiplicative background risk case u(x, y) = U(xy). Since
(−1)mu12(m−1) ≤ 0⇔ (−1)mxy
U (m+1)(xy)
U (m)(xy)
≥ m, for m = 1, 2, ..., N + 1 (25)
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(multiplicative risk apportionment of order m for m = 1, 2, ..., N + 1)
(See Eeckhoudt et al., 2009, Wang and Li, 2010 and Chiu et al., 2010 for more discussions of mul-
tiplicative risk apportionment of orderm.) Proposition 4.5 implies that, (i) if (−1)mxyU(m+1)(xy)
U(m)(xy)
≥
m for m = 1, 2, ..., N + 1 and ε˜ is positive (negative) expectation dependent on the background
risk y˜, then the agent’s attitude towards risk is first order conditional dependent risk aversion
and picd(k) > (<)pic(k); (ii) if (−1)mxyU
(m+1)(xy)
U(m)(xy)
≤ m for m = 1, 2, ..., N + 1 and ε˜ is positive
(negative) expectation dependent on the background risk y˜, then the agent’s attitude towards
risk is first order conditional dependent risk aversion and picd(k) < (>)pic(k).
6 Applications: the importance of background risk in risk di-
versification
In this section we illustrate the applicability of our results. In particular, we demonstrate how
our results can be used to gain additional insight into risk diversification in the presence of a
dependent background risk. We also show how our framework extends the understanding of
insurance supply, public investment decisions, naive diversified portfolio pricing, bank lending
and lottery business in the presence of a dependent background risk.
6.1 Background risk and risk diversification
Common wisdom suggests that diversification is a good way to reduce risk. Consider a set of n
lotteries whose net gains are characterized by ε˜1, ε˜2,...,ε˜n that are assumed to be independent
and identically distributed. Define the sample mean ε˜ = 1n
∑n
i=1 ε˜i, then, when w is not random,
Eu(w + Eε˜− pic( 1
n
), y˜) = Eu(w + ε˜, y˜), where ε˜ and y˜ are independent, (26)
and
Eu(w+Eε˜−picd( 1
n
), y˜) = Eu(w+ ε˜, y˜), where ε˜ and y˜ are not necessary independent. (27)
From (5), we know that pic( 1n) = O(
1
n2
). When n→∞, pic( 1n)→ 0 because diversification is an
efficient way to reduce risk. With an independent background risk, diversification can eliminate
idiosyncratic risk at the rate of 1
n2
and the agent is second order risk aversion. This is the well
known benefit of diversification. However, with a dependent background risk, it is not clear that
the benefit of diversification holds for a correlation averse agent.
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From Proposition 5.3 and equation (5), we obtain:
Proposition 6.1 (i) If (ε˜, y˜) ∈ HN and (−1)mu12(m−1) ≤ 0 for m = 1, 2, ..., N + 1, then
picd( 1n) = |O( 1n)|;
(ii) If (ε˜, y˜) ∈ IN and (−1)mu12(m−1) ≥ 0 for m = 1, 2, ..., N + 1, then picd( 1n) = |O( 1n)|;
(iii) If (ε˜, y˜) ∈ HN and (−1)mu12(m−1) ≥ 0 for m = 1, 2, ..., N + 1, then picd( 1n) = −|O( 1n)|;
(iv) If (ε˜, y˜) ∈ IN and (−1)mu12(m−1) ≤ 0 for m = 1, 2, ..., N + 1, then picd( 1n) = −|O( 1n)|.
Proposition 6.1 signs the effect of dependent background risk on the benefits of diversification:
if ε˜ and y˜ are positive (negative) expectation dependent and the agent is correlation aversion,
then picd( 1n) will be greater (less) than zero. Proposition 6.1 also shows that, in the presence
of an expectation dependent background risk, diversification can eliminate idiosyncratic risk
(picd( 1n) → 0, as n → ∞). Therefore, for correlation averse agents, the benefit of diversification
holds. However, the convergence rate is 1n rather than
1
n2
which implies that if we use zero
to approximate picd( 1n), then the error will be much larger in the presence of an expectation
dependent background risk.
6.2 Insurance supply
It is well known that the “Law of Large Numbers” is the actuarial basis of insurance pricing:
by pooling the risks of many policyholders, the insurer can take advantage of the “Law of Large
Numbers”. While Li (2011) and Soon et al. (2011) investigate how dependent background
risk affects the demand for insurance, Proposition 6.1 shows how dependent background risk
affects insurance supply. If 1n
∑n
i=1 ε˜i and y˜ are positive (negative) expectation dependent and
the insurer is correlation averse, then the insurance premium will be higher (lower) than the
actuarially fair premium. Suppose that ε˜i is the loss for insured i, and picd( 1n) and pic(
1
n) are the
risk premiums of the insurance company for the individual loss ε˜i. Proposition 6.1 implies that,
in the presence of a dependent background risk, the insurer can not always take advantage of
the benefit of diversification because the insurance risk will be eliminated only at the rate of 1n .
6.3 Public investment decisions
Arrow and Lind (1970) investigated the implications of uncertainty for public investment deci-
sions. They considered the case where all individuals have the same preferences U , and their
disposable incomes are identically distributed random variables represented by A˜. Suppose that
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the government undertakes an investment with returns represented by B˜, which are independent
of A˜. Let B¯ = EB˜ and X˜ = B˜− B¯. Consider a specific taxpayer and denote his fraction of this
investment by s with 0 ≤ s ≤ 1. Suppose that each taxpayer has the same tax rate and that
there are n taxpayers, then s = 1n . Arrow and Lind (1970) show that
EU(A˜+
B¯
n
+ r(n)) = EU(A˜+
B¯ + X˜
n
), (28)
where r(n) is the risk premium of the representative individual. They show that not only does
r(n) vanish, but so does the total of the risk premiums for all individuals: nr(n) approaches
zero as n rises.
Proposition 6.1 allows us to investigate the cases where A˜ and B˜ are dependent. Since (28)
can be rewritten as
EU(A˜+
B¯
n
+ r(n)) = EU(A˜+
B˜
n
), (29)
from Proposition 6.1, we obtain:
Proposition 6.2 (i) If (B˜, A˜) ∈ HN and (−1)ku12(k−1) ≤ 0 for k = 1, 2, ..., N + 1, then r(n) =
−|O( 1n)|;
(ii) If (B˜, A˜) ∈ IN and (−1)ku12(k−1) ≥ 0 for k = 1, 2, ..., N + 1, then r(n) = −|O( 1n)|;
(iii) If (B˜, A˜) ∈ HN and (−1)ku12(k−1) ≥ 0 for k = 1, 2, ..., N + 1, then r(n) = |O( 1n)|;
(iv) If (B˜, A˜) ∈ IN and (−1)ku12(k−1) ≤ 0 for k = 1, 2, ..., N + 1, then r(n) = |O( 1n)|.
Therefore, when A˜ and B˜ are expectation dependent, r(n) can not vanish as n becomes large.
Proposition 6.2 shows that if the return of the investment and the disposable incomes are positive
(negative) expectation dependent and the society is risk averse, then the risk premium of the
representative individual will remain less (greater) than zero for any large n.
6.4 Naive diversified portfolio pricing
The naive portfolio diversification rule is defined as one in which a fraction 1n of wealth is
allocated to each of the n assets available for investment at each rebalancing date. This rule is
easy to implement because it does not rely either on estimation or optimization. Many investors
continue to use this simple rule for allocating their wealth across assets (see, Benartzi and Thaler
2001; Huberman and Jiang 2006). DeMiguel et al. (2009) find that there is no single model that
consistently delivers a Sharpe ratio or a certainty-equivalent return that is higher than that of
the 1n portfolio rule.
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Suppose that ε˜i is the return of stock i, ε˜ is the return of a portfolio consisting of 1n shares
of each stock, and picd( 1n) and pic(
1
n) are minimum risk premiums the investor will demand for
this portfolio. Proposition 6.1 shows that, in the presence of a dependent background risk, the
investor can not always take advantage of the benefit of diversification and the portfolio risk will
be eliminated only at the rate of 1n . If ε˜ and y˜ are positive (negative) expectation dependent
and the investor is correlation averse, then the return of the naive diversified portfolio will be
higher (lower) than that corresponding to the portfolio’s expected return.
6.5 Other examples
We can also apply our result to other examples. Suppose that ε˜i is the default risk of borrower i,
and picd( 1n) and pic(
1
n) are the yield spread charged by the banker. Proposition 6.1 shows that if
ε˜ and y˜ are positive (negative) expectation dependent and the banker is correlation averse, then
the yield spread will be higher (lower) than that corresponding to the expected loss of default
risk.
It is believed that the lottery business is rather safe, because the “Law of Large Numbers”
entails that the average of the results from a large number of independent bets is quasi constant
(with a very small variance). Suppose that ε˜i is the payment to a winner i, picd( 1n) and pic(
1
n) are
the average risk premiums for a lottery ticket. Proposition 6.1 shows that if ε˜ and y˜ are positive
(negative) expectation dependent and the lottery business is correlation averse, then the price
for a lottery ticket must be higher (lower) than the expected payment of the lottery game.
7 Conclusion
In this study, we have generated the concepts of orders of conditional risk aversion to orders
of conditional dependent risk aversion. We have shown that first-order conditional dependent
risk aversion can appear in the framework of the expected utility function hypothesis. Our
contribution provides insight into the difficulty of obtaining risk diversification in the presence
of a dependent background risk.
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